Fishery share systems, ITQ markets, and the distribution of rents by Hatcher, Aaron
Fishery share systems, ITQ
markets
and the distribution of rents
Aaron Hatcher
University of Portsmouth, UK
Abstract Although, in most commercial ®sheries, ®shing crews are remuner-
ated under a share system, the implications of share systems for ITQ markets
have received relatively little attention. In this paper we model the impact of
extending crew shares of vessel operating costs to include payments for quota.
Allocative eYciency is maintained as long as any share system is adopted consis-
tently across the entire ¯eet. Making crews bear a share of quota costs, however,
simply in¯ates the quota price: at market equilibrium the vessel owners pro®t
share is unaVected. Crews lose out if the vessel is leasing quota in, but gain
if the vessel owner is a net seller of quota. We also consider the outcome if
only net purchasers of quota involve crews in the cost of quota. Here, all vessel
owners bene®t, while all crews see a reduction in their earnings. These results
are illustrated with a simple numerical example.
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1 Introduction
In many, if not most, commercial ®sheries, ®shing crews are rewarded under
a share or lay system (Sutinen, 1979; Anderson, 1982; Matthiasson, 1999;
McConnell and Price, 2006). Despite this, most economic models of the ®shery
either treat labour costs in a similar way to other variable costs, i.e., as related to
harvest or ®shing eVort, or assume (implicitly) that labour is paid a ®xed wage.
If instead there is a share system of crew remuneration, and owners of ®shing
®rms make decisions based only upon their shares of the costs and bene®ts to
the ®rm, this can have signi®cant implications for economic outcomes in the
®shery.
A case in point is the use of ITQs (individual transferable quotas) in ®sheries
management. ITQ systems are now widely employed in commercial ®sheries in
order to achieve eYcient regulation of harvest. Although, in almost all such
®sheries, crews are remunerated using a share system, it is common for quota
costs to be borne entirely by the vessel owner, as is the case in Iceland and
Australia, for example. In some instances, however, the fact that payments for
quota leasing appear as additional ®nancial costs to the ®rm has led to a prac-
tice of sharing quota costs between owner and crew, along with other variable
operating costs. This is now the norm in the UK, for example, where revenues
and operating costs (including the costs of quota leasing) are generally split
50:50 between owner and crew.1 It is not immediately clear, however, what
consequences this has for the economic performance of the ¯eet and for the
earnings of vessel owners and their crews. Empirical studies of crew remunera-
tion under ITQ systems have reported both negative (Pinkerton and Edwards,
2009) and positive (Abbott, Garber-onts and Wilen, 2010) income eVects due
to the introduction of ITQs, but there appears to be no record of the impact of
changes in crews shares of quota costs under an existing ITQ regime.
The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of sharing the cost of
quota for the generation and distribution of economic pro®ts in an ITQ ®shery.
Although there is now a large theoretical literature on ITQs, relatively few
authors have considered the implications of share payments for the properties
of ITQ markets. Anderson (1999) examines the long run eYciency of the ¯eet
under an ITQ system when the crew are paid on a share basis, concluding
that full eYciency in the long run can only be achieved if the vessel owner
and the crew have equal shares of both quota costs and what we will refer to as
operating pro®ts (revenues minus non-labour variable costs). If owners pay all
the quota costs, long run eYciency cannot be achieved, it is held, since individual
owners under-invest, vessels harvest too little and the ¯eet will be too large as a
consequence. Hannesson (2000) ®nds that the vessel owners decision to invest
in ITQs under a share system is distorted if a share of pro®ts is paid to the
crew, and argues that over-investment in physical capital may occur as a result.
McConnell and Price (2006) consider the allocative eYciency of ITQs with a
1Although the UK does not have a formal ITQ system as such, the arrangements for
devolved quota management allow a signi®cant amount of quota trading to take place in
practice, particularly in the in-year (lease) market.
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share system and show that the quota market will be ineYcient if the owners
shares of revenues and non-labour harvesting costs diverge. These authors do
not, however, examine the implications of crew shares for the generation and
distribution of rents under an ITQ system. Only Anderson (1999) explicitly
considers the relationship between the share rate and the price at which quota
is traded between vessels, but he does so in the context of a long run industrial
equilibrium, with adjustments in both ¯eet and stock size, and with identical
shares pertaining for both quota costs and operating pro®ts throughout.
The focus in this paper is on the relative share rates for quota costs and
operating pro®ts, rather than the share rate per se, and the impact these have on
economic pro®ts and the quota price, as well as the earnings by owner and crew.
We ®nd that the equilibrium quota price is sensitive to the diVerence between
the owners share of operating pro®ts and his share of quota costs. While this
may not be unexpected, what is perhaps less intuitive is that changes in the
owners share of the cost of quota have no eVect upon his total pro®t share
when shares are the same across the entire ¯eet. All the impacts of resultant
changes in the quota price are felt by the crew, who experience a loss or gain in
income as a result. We also examine a situation in which net sellers of quota are
reluctant to share quota income with the crew, while net purchasers of quota
share their quota costs. Here we ®nd that both categories of vessel owner are
better oV under a sharing arrangement, whereas both crews see a loss in income.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of a ®shing ®rm in
an ITQ market with crew shares. The implications of crew shares of quota costs
are then explored in the following two sections, ®rstly assuming that shares are
the same for all vessels in the ¯eet and then assuming that only ®rm owners
who are net purchasers of quota share quota costs. Section 5 provides a simple
numerical illustration of the results, while a ®nal section concludes.
2 A ®shing ®rmmodel with ITQs and crew shares
Consider an ITQ ®shery made up of a large number of price taking ®shing ®rms.
For simplicity, we will assume that each ®rm operates a single ®shing vessel. For
a representative ®rm, total short run pro®ts as a function of harvest qi and quota
demand Qi are given by
Bi (qi)- r

Qi - Q¯i

, (1)
where r is the equilibrium quota rental (lease) price and Q¯i ³ 0 is the ®rms
initial quota endowment (or, equivalently, the quantity of quota held by the
®rm as an asset). The private bene®t (or operating pro®ts) function Bi (qi)
is de®ned as
Bi (qi) º pqi - ci (qi) , (2)
where p is the market price for output and ci (qi) are (non-labour) variable
harvesting costs. As is usual, we assume convex costs, so that ci (qi) > 0 and
hence Bi (qi) < 0.
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Let the ®rm owners shares of operating pro®ts and quota lease costs be
given by 0 < ai < 1 and 0 < gi £ 1 respectively. The crews shares of operating
pro®ts and quota costs are therefore 0 < [1- ai] < 1 and 0 £ [1- gi] < 1.
We assume throughout that the crews reservation wage remains constant and
is always met, i.e., labours participation constraint is never binding. The total
quantity of labour is, as a consequence, unchanged. For simplicity, therefore,
the opportunity cost of crew labour is not explicitly included in the model.2
Assuming quota compliance, the owners short run pro®t maximisation prob-
lem is then
max
q,Q
oi º aiBi (qi)- gir

Qi - Q¯i

, s.t. qi ³ 0, Qi ³ 0, Qi ³ qi. (3)
From the ®rst order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a solution to (3), it is straight-
forward to ®nd the owners optimal decision rule for q*i = Q
*
i > 0 as
Bi (q
*
i ) =
gi
ai
r, (4)
where Bi (q
*
i ) º p - ci (q*i ). Unless gi = ai, this expression diVers from the
usual result for a competitive quota or permit market, which is the equality
of marginal (social) bene®ts with the equilibrium lease price of permits/quota.
Clearly, for marginal bene®ts (and hence marginal costs) to be equated across
all ®rms in the ®shery, we require either gi = ai for each ®rm, or, if gi = ai, for
the shares a and g to be the same for all ®rms. Otherwise, the quota allocation
will not be eYcient (except by chance).
In order to examine the quota market implications of diVerent share arrange-
ments, we go on to consider two scenarios: ®rstly, one in which any change in
the owners quota share relative to his share of operating pro®ts occurs across
all ®rms symmetrically; secondly, one in which a change in the owners quota
share aVects only some ®rms in the ¯eet. In each case, we assume that the size
of the ¯eet remains unchanged.
3 Crew shares are the same for all ®rms
To begin with, we assume that at quota market equilibrium the shares a and g
are the same across all ®rms in the ¯eet. We can therefore treat a single ®rm as
a model for the entire ¯eet, in the sense that the same equilibrium conditions
containing a and g hold for all ®rms (there is no requirement for symmetry in
the cost functions, for example).3 Note that heterogeneity in quota endowments
is suYcient to generate trade in quota.
Suppose we have g > a and hence, from equation (4), B (q*) > r. This
implies that the equilibrium quota price is less than the marginal bene®t of
harvest to the ®rm. Not surprisingly, if the owner bears a disproportionately
2Omitting the opportunity cost of labour from the bene®t function means that total short
run social bene®ts are overstated, but this makes no diVerence to our analysis.
3 Individual subscripts are dropped accordingly.
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large share of the cost of quota, quota is traded at below its marginal value to
the ®rm as a whole. If g < a, on the other hand, then B (q*) < r and quota is
eVectively overvalued with respect to its marginal bene®t to the ®rm.
Totally diVerentiating (4) and rearranging, we obtain an expression for the
slope of the owners quota demand as
dQ (r)
dr
=
dq (r)
dr
=
g
a
B- () < 0, (5)
where B- () is the slope of the inverse of B (q).4 All else equal, therefore,
the greater is the owners share g in the cost of quota, the steeper is his quota
demand function and hence the lower is his demand for quota at any given quota
price. As a result, the industry inverse quota demand will have a shallower slope
as g increases and a steeper slope as g is reduced. For a given total quota supply
(total allowable catch or TAC), therefore, the industry equilibrium quota price
is reduced (increased) if g is increased (reduced) relative to a. Changes in both
g and a which leave the ratio g/a unaltered, on the other hand, will have no
eVect upon individual quota demands and hence no eVect upon the equilibrium
quota price.
Notice that, given the concavity in the bene®t function, g = a in (4) seems
to imply that total ®rm pro®ts are not maximised by the ®rm owner: from (1)
we would expect total pro®ts for both owner and crew to be maximised where
B (q*) = r. If, instead, the ®rm operates where B (q*) > r for example, it
appears to underproduce for the observed quota price. But in this case, as
we have seen, the equilibrium quota price will be lower than it would be if
all ®rms set B (q*) = r. All else equal, if the quota market clears and the
quota allocation continues to be eYcient (as we have shown for symmetry in
shares) then output for the representative ®rm is unchanged by a change in g
and hence a change in the quota price r. Therefore, total economic pro®ts are
unaVected by an increase or a decrease in g, holding a constant: there is simply
a concomitant reduction or increase in the value of quota.
In order to examine this further, let r˜ be the equilibrium quota price when
g˜ = 1 > a (the owner bears all quota costs). Then from (4) we have
B (q*)|g>a =
g˜
a
r˜ =
1
a
r˜. (6)
If we now reduce g from g = 1 to g = a, holding a constant, we will then have
a quota price r such that
B (q*)|ga =
g
a
r = r. (7)
If there is no change in the output of the representative ®rm, as we have argued,
then
B (q*)|g>a = B (q*)|ga (8)
4We assume that, for all  ³ , the function   has an inverse - . By the inverse
function rule, we then have -  º  .
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and therefore
1
a
r˜ = r, (9)
which implies r > r˜. The quota price is therefore increased by the reduction in
g.
Suppose, in this example, that the ®rm is a net purchaser of quota, i.e.,
Q* > Q¯. When g˜ = 1, the cost to the owner of a unit of quota is g˜r˜ = r˜. If g
is then reduced to g = a, the owners unit quota costs are now gr. But, if a is
unchanged, we can observe that
gr = g
1
a
r˜ = r˜ = g˜r˜. (10)
Hence, if q* = Q* has not changed, the owners quota costs have not changed.
Since there has also been no change in the owners share of operating pro®ts a,
we can see that making the crew pay a share of the quota costs merely in¯ates
the quota price at their expense: at quota market equilibrium there is no net
gain to the ®rm owner.
We get the opposite result if g is increased from g = a < 1 to g = 1, again
holding a constant. Now, if the ®rm is a net purchaser of quota, we will see a
reduction in the equilibrium quota price and an increase in crew remuneration.
This represents a transfer from the total cost of quota to the total earnings of
the crew.
It is straightforward to show that if the ®rm is a net seller of quota (and we
assume that the income from leasing out quota is shared pro rata with the crew
- see Section 4) then the impacts on crew remuneration from a change in g are
simply reversed. Thus, all else equal, an increase in g results in a reduction in
both total quota income and total crew remuneration, while a reduction in g
produces an increase in total quota income and crew remuneration. At market
equilibrium, therefore, sharing the income from quota leasing with the crew has
no net negative impact upon the owners pro®ts.
In each case, with g and a the same across all ®rms in the ¯eet, the allocation
of quota continues to be eYcient. While the total value of quota changes with
changes in g relative to a, therefore, total economic pro®ts in the ®shery remain
unaltered.5
4 Crew quota shares diVer across ®rms
Although sharing the cost of quota with the crew has no impact upon the
owners total share of the pro®ts (operating pro®ts less quota costs, or plus
quota income) when all ®rms behave symmetrically, clearly there is an incentive
for individual owners whose quota endowments are such that they are net sellers
5Given our very simple industry model, we have abstracted from the implications of ®rm
heterogeneity, diVerences in factor cost/productivity and (hence) inframarginal rents. Eco-
nomic pro®ts may therefore be considered synonymous with resource rent.
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of quota to retain a 100% share of quota income. We therefore examine the quota
market outcome if only net buyers of quota reduce the owners quota share g.
Consider a ®shing ¯eet consisting of just two representative (price-taking)
®rms. Although we will assume for the moment that the ®rms are otherwise
identical, we let the quota endowments Q¯i be such that Firm 1 leases quota to
Firm 2.6 Let the initial quota shares (the same for both ®rms) be gi = 1 >
ai, i = 1, 2. To begin with, therefore, both ®rms quota demands satisfy
Bi (q
*
i ) =
1
ai
r, i = 1, 2. (11)
Now consider what happens if Firm 2, a net purchaser of quota, reduces g
to g = a < 1. The equilibrium quota price must then increase, since Firm
2s quota demand curve becomes ¯atter as a result and therefore the industry
inverse quota demand curve must become steeper. Because Firm 1s decision
rule (11) remains the same, its output and therefore quota demand is reduced
in response to the increased quota price and hence it now leases more quota to
Firm 2, which expands its output. Firm 2s quota demand now satis®es
B (q
*
) =
g
a
r = r, (12)
which implies B (q
*
) < B

 (q
*
), which, if the ®rms are identical, con®rms that
now q* > q
*
 . The result is nevertheless robust to heterogeneity in the ¯eet, as
the numerical example in Section 5 illustrates.
In the new quota market equilibrium, Firm 1s owner bene®ts from increased
quota leasing at an increased quota price, although his share of operating pro®ts
is reduced as the ®rms output is reduced. Employing the Envelope Theorem,
and using Q* = q
*
 , from the Lagrangian for (3) we can ®nd
do
dr
= -g

Q* - Q¯

> 0, (13)
which is unambiguously positive for a net seller of quota. Firm 1s crew, on
the other hand, clearly lose out since they only get a share of operating pro®ts,
which are reduced.
Firm 2 increases its output and hence total operating pro®ts, and both the
owners and the crews shares of operating pro®ts are therefore increased. While
total quota costs are unambiguously increased, these are now split between the
owner and the crew. From
do
dg
= -r Q* - Q¯ < 0 (14)
and
do
dr
= -g

Q* - Q¯

< 0, (15)
6Note that we continue to assume that there are a large number of competitive ®rms in
the ®shery: in eVect, we consider one ®rm as representative of all net sellers of quota and the
other as representative of all net purchasers of quota.
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we can see that, givenQ* > Q¯, the owner of Firm 2 will bene®t from a reduction
in g but lose from an increase in the quota price r. Since we have seen that a
reduction in g relative to a increases the owners marginal willingness to pay for
quota, however, it follows that the owner derives a net bene®t from the change
and hence we must have -do/dg+ do/dr > 0. The total crew remuneration
(pro®t share) for Firm 2 is given by
c º [1- a]B (q*)- [1- g] r

Q* - Q¯

, (16)
so that we can ®nd
dc
dg
= [[1- a]B (q*)- [1- g] r]
dq*
dg
+ r

Q* - Q¯

, (17)
which again uses Q* = q
*
 . Given that the owner ensures that aB

 (q
*
) = gr,
and that now we have a = g, this reduces to
dc
dg
= r

Q* - Q¯

> 0. (18)
Similarly, we can ®nd
dc
dr
= - [1- g]

Q* - Q¯

< 0. (19)
Thus we con®rm that a reduction in g and an increase in the quota price will
lead to a reduction in crew remuneration for Firm 2. Finally, notice that while
the total value of quota increases, the total economic pro®t in the ®shery must
decrease, since the allocation of quota is now ineYcient.
5 A numerical example
We illustrate the results using a simple numerical example with two ®rms in the
®shery: one ®rm to represent all net sellers of quota and the other to represent
all net quota purchasers. To give a speci®c functional form to equation (3), let
oi º ai

pqi - 1
2
ciq

i

- gir

Qi - Q¯i

, i = 1, 2. (20)
The ®rst order conditions for the owners optimal choices of q*i = Q
*
i are then
ai [p- ciq*i ] = gir, i = 1, 2. (21)
Solving for r, and substituting using  º Q* +Q* = Q¯ + Q¯, we can employ
a little manipulation to ®nd
Q* = q
*
 =
p

a
g
- a
g

+
a
g
c
a
g
c +
a
g
c
, (22)
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together with a similar expression for Q*, as well as
r =
p
a
g
[c + c]- a
g
cc
a
g
· g
a
c + c
. (23)
Equations (22) and (23) together describe fully the quota market equilib-
rium. Given the parameters p and Q¯i as well as the cost coeYcients ci, we can
then calculate the equilibrium quota market outcomes for any combination of
the shares ai and gi.
Let p = $10, 000, Q¯ = 100 tonnes and Q¯ = 20 tonnes, so that  = 120
tonnes, with c = 0.1 and c = 0.05. Notice that we have now relaxed the
assumption that the ®rms are identical: here Firm 2 is clearly more eYcient
than Firm 1, although its initial quota endowment is smaller.
Table I shows the quota market outcome when a = a = 0.5 and g =
g = 1. Firm 1 leases 60 tonnes of quota to Firm 2 at an equilibrium price of
$3, 000. Total economic pro®ts in the ®shery are $960,000, of which $360,000
is captured in the value of quota. In Table II, we show the results when both
gi shares are reduced to equal the ai shares. Notice that the (eYcient) quota
allocation is unchanged, as are the total economic pro®ts in the ®shery. Now,
however, the value of quota is doubled and the impact of this is entirely felt by
the crew. The crew of Firm 1 more than double their income (from $160,000 to
$340,000) while the crew of Firm 2 see their total remuneration reduced from
$320,000 to $140,000.
Table III shows the outcome when only Firm 2 reduces g to equal a, while
Firm 1 retains g = 1. Compared to the outcome in Table I, we can see that
although the total value of quota is increased, total pro®ts in the ®shery are
reduced since the quota allocation is now ineYcient. The owner of Firm 1 gains
as a result of the increased leasing of quota to Firm 2, but Firm 1s crew lose
out. As predicted, there is also a net gain for the owner of Firm 2, while the
crew of Firm 2 suVer a net loss in income.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that, all else equal, changes in the share of quota costs paid by
the ®rm owner, when undertaken symmetrically across the whole ¯eet, have an
impact upon the equilibrium quota price but do not change the owners total
pro®t share. The eVects of changes in the quota price fall entirely upon the
crew, who gain or lose a share of pro®ts as a result. We have also seen that
the eYciency of quota allocation is maintained as long as the owners shares
of quota costs and operating pro®ts are consistent across the ¯eet: there is no
requirement for these shares to be equal.
Given this, if the ®xed (capital) costs of the ®rm are paid from the owners
share of the total pro®ts, as is usually the case, there appear to be no implica-
tions for long run eYciency if there are changes across the ¯eet in the owners
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share of quota costs. A positive crew reservation wage on the other hand, which
represents a quasi-®xed cost to be covered by the crews share of operating prof-
its, would impose an upper limit on the percentage of quota costs which can be
borne by the crew. We have assumed, however, that labours reservation wage
is exogenous to the ®shery in question. We have also assumed, in our analysis of
the eVects of changes in quota shares, that this remuneration constraint is never
binding. We have further assumed that changes in crew shares do not aVect
their incentives for eVort and hence (in our model) harvesting costs. Through-
out, labour retains a share in marginal pro®ts and we would not therefore expect
any fundamental change in the incentive structure of the labour contract.
If only some ®rm owners share quota costs with the crew (and we assumed
that net sellers of quota might be reluctant to do so) we saw that quota allocation
would no longer be eYcient and that total economic pro®ts in the ®shery would
be reduced as a result. Nevertheless, the equilibrium quota price would still
increase, and all ®rm owners would bene®t at the expense of their crews.
Although there seems to be a widespread, if not universal, reluctance on
behalf of the governments of ®shing nations to attempt to extract resource rents
from the industry, a share system which eVectively increases the proportion
of economic pro®ts which are re¯ected in the value of quota has interesting
implications for rent capture policies (see, for example, Grafton, 1992; 1995). At
the very least, the generation of rents in the ®shery is more accurately measured
than in a share ®shery where crew do not share in the cost of quota, since a
part of the surplus previously paid to the crew is now transferred to the value
of quota. In consequence, a tax on quota value, for example, would have the
potential to capture a greater proportion of the rents generated in the ®shery.
Finally, just as we have not addressed the evolution and persistence of ®sh-
eries share systems in general, a subject which has been well covered elsewhere
(see, for example, McConnell and Price, 2006), so we have left to one side the
process by which changes in quota shares might be negotiated. The bargaining
aspects of this could be a fruitful area for future investigation.
10
References
Abbott, J. K., B. Garber-onts and J. E. Wilen, 2010. Employment and
remuneration eVects of IFQs in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands crab ®sheries.
Marine Resource Economics, 25: 333-354.
Anderson, L. G., 1982. The share system in open access and optimally
regulated ®sheries. Land Economics, 58: 435-449.
Anderson, L. G., 1999. ITQs in share system ®sheries: implications for eY-
ciency, distribution and tax policy. In: R. Arnason and H. H. Gissurarson, eds.,
Individual Transferable Quotas in Theory and Practice. Reykjavik: University
of Iceland Press, p.169-184.
Grafton, R. Q., 1992. Rent capture in an individual transferable quota
®shery. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 49: 497-503.
Grafton, R. Q., 1995. Rent capture in a rights-based ®shery. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 28: 48-67.
Hannesson, R., 2000. A note on ITQs and optimal investment. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 40: 181-188.
Matthiasson, T., 1999. Cost sharing and catch sharing. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 58: 25-44.
McConnell, K. E., and M. Price, 2006. The lay system in commercial ®sh-
eries: origin and implications. Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement, 51: 295-307.
Pinkerton, E., and D. N. Edwards, 2009. The elephant in the room: the
hidden costs of leasing individual transferable ®shing quotas. Marine Policy,
33: 707-713.
Sutinen, J. G., 1979. Fishermens remuneration systems and implications
for ®sheries development. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 26: 146-162.
11
Firm 1 Firm 2
a = 0.5 g = 1.0 Q
*
 = 40 a = 0.5 g = 1.0 Q
*
 = 80
Total Owner Crew Total Owner Crew
B (q*i ) 320 160 160 640 320 320
-r Q*i - Q¯i 180 180 0 -180 -180 0
B (q*i )- r

Q*i - Q¯i

500 340 160 460 140 320

iB (q
*
i ) = 960 r = 3
Table I. Owners bear 100% of quota costs (in $000)
Firm 1 Firm 2
a = 0.5 g = 0.5 Q
*
 = 40 a = 0.5 g = 0.5 Q
*
 = 80
Total Owner Crew Total Owner Crew
B (q*i ) 320 160 160 640 320 320
-r Q*i - Q¯i 360 180 180 -360 -180 -180
B (q*i )- r

Q*i - Q¯i

680 340 340 280 140 140

iB (q
*
i ) = 960 r = 6
Table II. Owners bear 50% of quota costs (in $000)
Firm 1 Firm 2
a = 0.5 g = 1.0 Q
*
 = 10 a = 0.5 g = 0.5 Q
*
 = 110
Total Owner Crew Total Owner Crew
B (q*i ) 95 47.5 47.5 797.5 398.75 398.75
-r Q*i - Q¯i 405 405 0 -405 -202.5 -202.5
B (q*i )- r

Q*i - Q¯i

500 452.5 47.5 392.5 196.25 196.25

iB (q
*
i ) = 892.5 r = 4.5
Table III. Buyers bear 50% of quota costs; sellers keep 100% of quota income
(in $000)
